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THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE LAND
USE CONTROLS IN LARGE-SCALE
SUBDIVISIONS: THE COMPANION




The milestone Supreme Court decision in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.' in 1926, validating comprehensive public land use
controls, has had a profound effect on American life and jurispru-
dence. The decision provided the constitutional foundation for an
explosive growth in modem zoning, subdivision controls, and other
governmental land use regulation that has transformed the organiza-
tion and development of land and communities.2  Euclid also trig-
gered a new era of takings jurisprudence3 and an ongoing debate on
American private property rights.
© Copyright 2001 Gerald Komgold
t Dean and Everett D. and Eugenia S. McCurdy Professor of Law. The author expresses
his appreciation to Erin Peterson, Case Western Reserve University School of Law Class of
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' 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
2 For a history of this regulation, see generally ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW
OF ZONING (3d ed. 1986); NORMAN WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW: LAND USE AND
THE POLICE POWER (1974-1985).
3 See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) (hold-
ing that an owner of beachfront property was denied all "economically viable use of his land"
by the Beachfront Management Act, amounting to a regulatory taking); Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (finding a taking where a building permit was condi-
tioned on the property owner's granting of a public access easement because no legitimate pur-
pose was thereby advanced); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)
(upholding a New York landmark law that prevented property owner from building onto a
landmark because the law was substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare).
4 See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985); Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88
COLUM. L REV. 1600 (1988); Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967); Marga-
ret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of
Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667 (1988); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of
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But another important land use story began in the twentieth cen-
tury, rooted not in governmental regulation but in consensual, market
arrangements. Starting in this period, developers employed compre-
hensive private land use controls to produce large-scale residential
developments and communities.5 These developers sought to achieve
a vision of beauty and tranquility through a scheme of real covenants
(or "servitudes") that imposed an extensive system of building and
use restrictions, aesthetic controls, and other guidelines. 6  These ef-
forts succeeded to a great extent.7 At the same time, these develop-
ments were often marred by the inclusion of covenants barring racial
and religious minorities, a practice that continued until enforcement
of such restrictions was held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court in 1948.8
Today, the development model utilizing private land use controls
is more vibrant than ever. Over recent years, there has been an explo-
sive growth in subdivision developments with underlying servitude
regimes, and an increasing number of these include a homeowners
association empowered to administer and enforce the covenants.9 In
Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433
(1993); William Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political
Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995).
s See infra Part I.
6 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES (2000) develops a modem law of
real covenants, equitable servitudes, easements, profits, and licenses into an integrated and
modem law of servitudes. See also Susan F. French, Highlights of the New Restatement (Third)
of Property: Servitudes, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 225 (2000) (surveying the changes to
traditional servitudes law brought about by the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes
(2000)); Susan F. French, Design Proposal for the New Restatement of the Law of Property-
Servitudes, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1213 (1988) (proposing a design for a Restatement of the
law of servitudes). For background on these interests, see generally GERALD KORNGOLD,
PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS: EASEMENTS, REAL COVENANTS, AND EQUITABLE
SERVITUDES (1990). For representative articles on the discussion of modernizing the law of
servitudes, see Gregory Alexander, Freedom, Coercion, and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL
L. REV. 883 (1988); Curtis Berger, Some Reflections on a Unified Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1323 (1982); Lawrence Berger, Integration of the Law of Easements, Real Covenants
and Equitable Servitudes, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 337 (1986); Robert Ellickson, Alternatives
to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681
(1973); Richard Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906 (1988); Susan
F. French, Servitudes Reform and the New Restatement of Property: Creation Doctrines and
Structural Simplification, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 928 (1988); Susan F. French, Toward a Modern
Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter
French, Modern Law of Servitudes]; Uriel Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of Servitudes,
55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177 (1982); Carol Rose, Servitudes, Security, and Assent: Some Comments
on Professors French and Reichman, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1403 (1982).
7 See infra Parts IV, IV.A-B.
" See infra Part IV.C.
9 There has been much discussion of community associations. See, e.g., Robert C. El-
lickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75 (1998); Mark Fenster, Com-
munity by Covenant, Process and Design: Cohousing and the Contemporary Common Interest
Community, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 3 (1999); Wayne S. Hyatt, Common Interest Commu-
nities: Evolution and Reinvention, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 303 (1998); Gerald Komgold,
Resolving the Flaws of Residential Servitudes and Owners Associations: For Reformation Not
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1975, housing units in homeowners association developments were
estimated at 2.58% of total American housing units; by 1998, the fig-
ure was 14.67%, with a total of forty-two million Americans living is
such communities. 10
A prime example of this new large-scale subdivision phenome-
non was developed by the Van Sweringen brothers during the same
period in which Euclid was decided, on land located a few miles away
from the Village of Euclid." The Van Sweringen development, sit-
ting in what are now the cities of Shaker Heights, Beachwood, and
Pepper Pike, Ohio, exemplifies the strengths and potential pitfalls of
private land use controls.
This Article will examine the use of servitudes in major subdivi-
sion projects, using the Van Sweringen development as an illustration
of the competing policy considerations, legal issues, and judicial ap-
proaches. As will be developed below, the Van Sweringen story of-
fers important insights into fundamental issues of modem servitudes
law. It shows the value of modem subdivision arrangements, demon-
strates the importance of judicial validation of servitude schemes ex-
cept in unusual situations, and underscores the advantage of providing
for flexibility in the future so that the power of the dead hand is lim-
ited. The Van Sweringen experience, however, also cautions that
administration of the servitudes by a central body must reflect demo-
cratic values and process and serves as a powerful reminder that
covenants that attempt to regulate personal autonomy, status, or con-
duct within the home should not be enforced.
I. THE VAN SWERINGEN DEVELOPMENT
A. Land Development in Early Twentieth Century America
The Van Sweringens began their development during a period of
large-scale residential development across the United States.12 Dur-
ing the early decades of the twentieth century, a new breed of subdi-
Termination, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 513; Robert G. Natelson, Condominiums, Reform, and the Unit
Ownership Act, 58 MoNT. L. REV. 495 (1997); Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighbor-
hood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning with Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neigh-
borhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 827 (1999); Glen 0. Robinson, Communities, 83 VA. L. REV.
269 (1997); James L. Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of Promissory Servitudes: Toward Opti-
mizing Economic Utility, Individual Liberty, and Personal Identity, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 1.
'0 See CLIFFORD J. TREEsE, COMMUNITY ASS'N INST., COMMUNITY ASS'N FACTBOOK 19
(Frank H. Spink ed., 1999); see also UNITED STATEs ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOV-
ERNMENTAL RELATIONS, RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASS'N: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYsTEM? 1, 3 (1989) (estimating that 12%-15% of the population live in
such communities).
" See infra Part LB.
12 See EVAN McKENzIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF
RESmENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 36 (1994).
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viders, sometimes known as "community builders," began developing
large tracts of land into complete residential communities. 13 These
communities were typically developed in stages, with the subdivider
dividing the land into lots and installing utilities, streets, and other
communal facilities section by section.' These lots were then mar-
keted to individual buyers for the construction of homes.
The first phase of community building, which reached maturity
in the 1920s, created residential subdivisions for expensive homes to
be occupied by the wealthy. 15 By the time of the Great Depression,
luxury subdivisions had been built across the country. 16 These large-
scale developers sought to produce high-quality developments with
beautifully designed environments and fine homes harmonious with
each other and their surroundings. The community builders believed
that maintaining high standards would not only achieve their vision of
beauty but would also bring far more profits than the practice of
speculative lot selling. 17 The community builders represented a mi-
nority of land developers. Their belief in planning, engagement in
large-scale projects, and commitment to high-quality design and envi-
ronments distinguished them from typical subdividers, sometimes
known as "land butchers," whose business practices were a source of
scandal.
18
Inspiration for the community builders has been traced to the late
nineteenth-century Garden City movement in England, led by
Ebenezer Howard. 19 Howard's work inspired a new interest in town
planning and development of large-scale model communities. In
England, government played a key role in building some Garden City
type communities. In the United States, in contrast, the private sector
developed the large land projects.2 °
A system of private restrictive covenants was the key vehicle
used by the American community builders to achieve their vision of
beauty and value. Early twentieth-century developers imposed re-
strictive covenants on the lots containing building and use restric-
tions, architectural and design controls, housing standards, lot size
rules, landscapinj gnidelines, and other standards designed to accom-
plish their goals. 1 The covenants were the essential ingredient of
13 See MARC A. WEISS, THE RISE OF THE COMMUNITY BUILDERS 45 (1987).
14 See id.
'5 See id. at 2. In the period after World War II, developers shifted to creating develop-
ments for more modest-income purchasers. See id.
16 See MCKENZIE, supra note 12, at 43.
17 See WEISS, supra note 13, at 46.
8 See id. at 5.
19 See MCKENZIE, supra note 12, at 2-3.
20 See id. at 7-8.
21 See WEISS, supra note 13, at 45.
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these developments, and the developers and their trade associations
promoted their use and benefits.22
B. The Van Sweringen Project
The Van Sweringen brothers-Oris Paxton and Mantis James-
began acquiring land to the east of Cleveland in 1905; eventually,
their holdings grew to over 4,000 acres.23 Having previously failed in
a modest-income development in another Cleveland suburb, the Van
Sweringens sought to develop their new project as a high-quality
residential community for upper-class and upper-middle-class fami-
lies.24 Because of geographical conditions and past under-building,
demand for high-end housing was high72
To accomplish their vision, the Van Sweringens engaged the
F.A. Pease Engineering Company to lay out the first sections of the
community in what is now part of the City of Shaker Heights. This
area was the westernmost portion of the Van Sweringen holdings and
is located some eight miles east of Cleveland on heights overlooking
Cleveland.26 Pease did not follow the typical grid pattern of streets,
but instead laid out broad avenues, intersected by elliptical streets
featuring grassy medians and following the natural topography.27
Existing lakes were preserved and others were created. The Van
Sweringens bought a railroad line and extended it into the Shaker
portion of their development by 1920, providing fast commuter serv-
ice to downtown Cleveland and making the new community even
more desirable.28
The Van Sweringen brothers created the Van Sweringen Com-
pany in 1913 as the entity to subdivide and market the properties.
29
The company made extensive use of restrictive covenants to achieve
the goal of developing a high-quality, aesthetically pleasing, hanno-
nious residential neighborhood. Although these covenants varied
somewhat in the different stages of the development and as the proj-
ect expanded east into more modem sections of Shaker Heights and
into what are now the cities of Beachwood and Pepper Pike, they
typically contained building and use restrictions, lot requirements,
22 See MCKENZIE, supra note 12, at 36.
23 See CrrY OF SHAKER HEIGHTS LANDMARK COMM'N, THE VAN SWERINGEN IN-
FLUENCE: SHAKER HEIGHTS 8 (Claudia R. Boatright ed., 4th ed. 1995); IAN S. HABERMAN, THE
VAN SWERINGENS OF CLEVELAND 9, 12 (1979).
24 See JOHN STILGOE, BORDERLAND: ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN SUBURB, 1820-1939, at
240-41 (1988).
25 See HABERMAN, supra note 23, at 10; STILGOE, supra note 24, at 240.
26See STILGOE, supra note 24, at 239.
27 See CITY OF SHAKER HEIGHTS LANDMARK COMM'N, supra note 23, at 9; HABERMAN,
supra note 23, at 11.
28 See CITY OF SHAKER HEIGHTS LANDMARK COMM'N, supra note 23, at 8.
29 See HABERMAN, supra note 23, at 12.
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architectural and aesthetic controls, and anti-nuisance provisions.30
Marketing materials touted the "good life" in the new community:
To where, beyond the city, there is peace. Six hundred
feet up in the sunshine, with trees and gardens, winding
roadways and protected homes. Shaker Village is miles
away from the city's grime and turmoil but only minutes
away in actual time.3'
Beneath this idyllic vision lay another story-the racial and religious
discrimination permitted by the covenants 32 and the class divisions
arising from such exclusive communities and their high-cost building
standards.33
Sales of lots began in 1916.34 Lot sales and housing construction
boomed-between 1919 and 1929, an average of 300 homes were
built annually and nearly all homes "cost what many Americans con-
sidered a large sum indeed., 35 Later in the 1920s, the Van Swerin-
gens began developing the far eastern portions of their land. But by
the early 1930s, after they suffered major reverses in their railroad
business, the Van Sweringens lost control of their unsold land.36 To-
day, the land subjected to restrictive covenants by the Van Swerin-
gens lies in the cities of Shaker Heights, Beachwood, and Pepper
Pike.
II. VALIDATION OF SUBDIVISION COVENANTS
Common law judges expressed ambivalence or even antipathy
for real covenants, raising questions as to the validity of large-scale
subdivision schemes and community association arrangements con-
structed on the foundation of covenants law. As the twentieth century
began, however, there was an important shift in the way some courts
viewed servitudes and in the language they used to describe and con-
ceptualize them. This change was essential for the acceptance and
validation of subdivisions. Dixon v. Van Sweringen Co., 37 decided by
the Ohio Supreme Court in 1929 and upholding the Van Sweringen
covenants, was, and remains, a leading case in announcing this new
30 These covenants, and the legal issues surrounding them, are examined below. See infra
Parts IV, IV.A-B.
31 VAN SWERINGEN CO., PEACEFUL SHAKER VILLAGE (1927), quoted in CITY OF SHAKER
HEIGHTS, SHAKER VILLAGE COLORS 3 (1983).
32 See infra Part IV.C.
33 See MARGARET MARSH, SUBURBAN LIvEs 170 (1990); MCKENZIE, supra note 12, at
77.
3 See HABERMAN, supra note 23, at 13.
31 STILGOE, supra note 24, at 247.
36 See id. at 250.
37 166 N.E. 887, 892 (Ohio 1929) (holding that restrictive covenants are valid so long as
such covenants are not contrary to public policy).
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judicial attitude. Dixon continues to be highly influential in Ohio and
the starting point for judicial inquiry in subdivision cases three-
quarters of a century later.
A. Traditional Bias Against Restrictions
Historically, American courts were quite suspicious of real
covenants and spoke of them with disfavor. Ohio courts were no
different, and judicial opinions in the early twentieth century often
contained statements to the effect that "[c]ovenants restricting the use
of real property are strictly construed, and doubts as to the meaning
thereof are resolved in favor of the free use of the property for lawful
purposes."39 This was "based upon the old principle that restrictions
are not favored in the law.'40 This "anti-restrictions policy" was more
than an empty mantra (for some courts, at least), and formed the basis
for rejecting enforcement of restrictive covenants.41 Moreover, the
anti-restrictions policy continues to be resilient, with modem courts in
Ohio often declaring a policy disfavoring restrictions on land as a
preamble to deciding the real covenant or subdivision case at hand.42
B. Dixon v. Van Sweringen Co.
Dixon v. Van Sweringen Co.43 stands in important contrast to this
anti-restrictions strain in American and Ohio jurisprudence. Dixon is
an important milestone in de-demonizing real covenants and in rec-
ognizing the value and importance of subdivision arrangements. Just
as Euclid in 1926 validated public land use controls, Dixon in 1929
legitimized the newly emerging regime of private land use arrange-
ments.
Dixon was an action to quiet title brought by Janie A. Dixon, a
purchaser of a lot in Shaker Heights subject to fourteen restrictions
substantially similar to those imposed on the other lots in the 4,000
acre tract that the defendant Van Sweringen Company was develop-
38 See, e.g., Hays v. St. Paul M. E. Church, 63 N.E. 1040 (111. 1902); Whitmarsh v. Rich-
mond, 20 A.2d 161 (Md. 1941); Kitching v. Brown, 73 N.E. 241 (N.Y. 1905); Ragland v.
Overton, 44 SV.2d 768 (Tex. App. 1931).
39 Thompson v. Ketter, 5 Ohio Law Abs. 710 (Ohio Ct. App. 1926); accord Hunt v. Held,
107 N.E. 765, 766 (Ohio 1914) (strictly construing "only" in a deed); Olmsted v. Schrembs, 165
N.E. 51, 52 (Ohio Ct. App. 1928) (strictly interpreting "adjoining" in a conveyance of property).
40 Hitz v. Flower, 135 N.E. 450,453 (Ohio 1922).
41 See Frederick v. Hay, 135 N.E. 535, 536-37 (Ohio 1922) (refusing to enforce a cove-
nant because doubt should be resolved in favor of unrestricted land).
42 See University Hills, Inc. v. Patton, 427 F.2d 1094, 1099 (6th Cir. 1970) ("In Ohio, as
in most states, there is a policy favoring the free and unrestricted use of land."); Driscoll v.
Austintown Ass'n, 328 N.E.2d 395, 404 (Ohio 1975) ("Our legal system does not favor restric-
tions on the use of property."); Schurenberg v. Butler County Bd. of Elections, 605 N.E.2d
1330, 1332 (Ohio CL App. 1992) ("This court is well aware of the law's general aversion to-
ward efforts to restrict land use").
43 166 N.E. 887 (Ohio 1929).
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ing. In addition to the residential restrictions on the subdivision,
Dixon challenged three particular provisions reserving to the Com-
pany the right to give approvals regarding street and utilities and the
right to change or cancel the restrictions under certain stated circum-
stances. The Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the restrictions against
these challenges. The opinion is noteworthy as it, without reference
to the anti-restrictions bias of other courts, provided a theoretical and
policy basis for upholding real covenants in general and subdivision
covenants in particular.
1. Real Covenants as Contracts
Unlike other courts, the Dixon court treated real covenants like
other contracts deserving of enforcement under the concept of free-
dom of contract:
One of the most formal contracts known to the law is a deed
for land. When the same is based upon a fair and adequate
consideration, by persons competent to contract, under no du-
ress, not overreached by fraud, and containing no provisions
which affect adversely the interests of the public, the sus-
taining of such a contract makes an appeal to public policy
quite as strong as any of the subjects within its protection.
44
Yet real covenants differ from traditional bilateral contracts in that
there is no face-to-face bargaining between the promisee trying to
enforce the contract and the promisor against whom enforcement is
sought. In Dixon, the lot in question was not conveyed directly by the
Company to Dixon; rather, the lot was originally conveyed under re-
striction to an initial purchaser, A, who then conveyed the land to B
who then conveyed to C who then conveyed to Dixon. Unlike with a
traditional bilateral contract, Dixon never expressly undertook any
obligation and never had dealings with the Company (the party
claiming the benefit of the promise).
The Dixon court, however, leaped this theoretical gap. It found
the contract theory applicable because, in its view, the acceptance by
Dixon of the deed to the lot with notice of the scheme of restrictions
made her "bound thereby." 45 Covenants would thus be treated as
contracts and deserving of enforcement as a general matter.
44 Id. at 889.
41 Id. at 888.
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2. Pro-Subdivision Policy
The Dixon court went beyond upholding covenants as a variety
of general contracts. Rather, the court indicated that it understood the
particular benefits of reciprocal subdivision arrangements and those
particular consensual ties: "[W]e see no reason for denying the right
of these parties to contract between themselves, the result of such
contracts up to date bein ... to create a highly exclusive and valu-
able residential district.'
C. Policies Supporting Covenant Enforcement
Various reasons support upholding real covenants and subdivi-
sion arrangements despite the traditional anti-restrictions policy. A
number of these are reflected in the Dixon opinion.
1. Efficiency
Real covenants help to achieve the efficient allocation of land re-
sources. By using real covenants, one can acquire a nonpossessory
interest in the land of another but without having to buy more than
she wants. For A to prevent a neighbor B from developing his land
for industrial or commercial uses, A can purchase from B a promise to
restrict B's land to residential uses. If covenants were not permitted
by the law, A would have to purchase B's entire fee interest. This
would be inefficient as A would be spending to acquire more land
interest than she needs or will use. Moreover, by allowing B to sell a
covenant to A, B can cash out some of the value of his land while still
retaining productive use of the property since B can still use it for
residential purposes.
In subdivision arrangements such as the Van Sweringen devel-
opment, there are reciprocal burdens and benefits among the proper-
ties. Each property is made less valuable by the restrictions, such as a
ban on non-residential uses, but, at the same time, each property is
made more desirable by the creation of a quiet residential area be-
cause of imposition of the same restrictions on the other lots. In more
modem subdivisions, even greater efficiency is achieved where the
costs of common facilities (such as infrastructure or recreational
amenities) are spread among the group of owners. The Van Swerin-
gen development specifically contemplated efficiency gains from re-
ciprocal restrictions. Shaker Village Standards, a pamphlet published
in 1925 and 1928 describing the restrictions for new homeowners,
stated:
46 Id. at 892.
2001]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAWREVIEW
The ugly residence injures surrounding property values,
particularly with relation to possibilities of re-sale. This rep-
resents a damage for which there is no insurance coverage.
Against such occurrences the only safeguard is in creat-
ing definite standards for home construction. And this is
practical only where land is extensively held under single
control for a long period of time.
Shaker Village is the largest area for high-class resi-
dences under single control. Standards and protective re-
strictions have been applied there from the outset. Over 2600
homes have been built there. They cover a construction span
of about twelve years. 47
Although Dixon arose in the early stage of American major sub-
division development,48 the court indicated that it understood the effi-
ciency gains of real covenants and subdivision arrangements. It
stated that the scheme of restrictions for the tract was "designed to
make it highly attractive for residential purposes '' 9 and that "these
restrictions are among the very elements that may contribute to the
value of the lots affected thereby. 5°
2. Freedom of Choice
Moreover, the decision to purchase in a residential subdivision
with a scheme of reciprocal benefits and burdens is a voluntary choice
that should be respected by the law unless there is a compelling rea-
son not to do so. This is especially powerful since the family home
has played a key role in the American mind and experience.
51
The purchasers in the Van Sweringen development chose to buy
lots in a development "designed to make it more attractive for resi-
dential purposes by reason of certain restrictions to be imposed on
each of the separate lots sold.",52 Indeed promotional materials for the
Van Sweringen development appealed to the purchaser's wish to live
in an exclusive, idyllic community:
...On the high rolling land six hundred feet above the
lake with great century-old trees, murmuring streams, and
long vistas of beauty everywhere, they offer ideal sites for
47 SHAKER VILLAGE STANDARDS 5 (2d ed. 1928).
48 The first phase of large-scale community development in America only reached matur-
ity in the 1920s; later phases followed. See WEISS, supra note 13, at 2.
49 Dixon, 166 N.E. at 889.
so Id.
51 See Crowley v. Knapp, 288 N.W.2d 815, 828 (Wis. 1980) (Coffey, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing that people who have purchased "a home, 'The American Dream,"' are entitled to en-
forcement of covenants upon which they relied when they bought the house).
-2 Dixon, 166 N.E. at 888.
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delightful country estates removed from town and yet within
easy distance of it.. .At the end of the rainbow lies Shaker
Village.
53
John Stilgoe asserts that the Van Sweringens promoted their devel-
opment as "cementing family ties and elevating the spirit of parents
and children," and thus they "formulated a sort of secular religion of
the home. 54
The Dixon court indicated a willingness to respect the buyer's
choice of how to achieve fulfillment:
Doubtless all these terms, conditions, reservations, etc., were
fully considered by each purchaser at the time of acquiring
his lot, and, unless he was willing to transfer such personal
rights as a part of what he was paying for and receiving, he
would not have purchased. If he saw fit to make such a bar-
gain, we cannot say it was against public policy.
5 5
This view reflected the growing belief by lot owners in early twenti-
eth century subdivisions across the country that the covenant schemes
increased their property values and satisfaction.
56
3. Moral Obligation
Real covenants also deserve enforcement for moral reasons. It
would be unfair for A to purchase property at a reduced price because
the land is subject to a covenant benefiting B and then resell it free
and clear of the covenant. B would lose the value of a bargained and
paid-for right in A's land and A would be receiving a windfall by
selling the land at its full, unrestricted price.57 Dixon reflected this
moral concern:
"The purchaser who bought with the intent or purpose of dis-
regarding the restrictions and devoting the property pur-
chased by him to any purpose that might suit his whim or his
business needs, regardless of the restrictions written in his
deed, has no standing in a court of equity."
53 VAN SWERINGEN CO., supra note 31, quoted in CITY OF SHAKER HEIGHTS LANDMARK
COMM'N, supra note 23, at 12 (spacing in original).
s STILGOE, supra note 24, at241.
5 Dixon, 166 N.E. at 890.
6 See WEISS, supra note 13, at 69.
57 See Tulk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143, 1144 (Ch. 1848) ("[N]othing could be more
inequitable than that the original purchaser should be able to sell the property the next day for a
greater price.").
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.... [I]s it the apparent desire of a lot owner to re-
lease the property in question from strictly residential pur-
poses, and thus throw it open to such value as it might
have if unrestricted[?] 8
The endorsement of real covenants and subdivisions by the
Dixon court served as a break with the anti-restrictions sentiment of
earlier Ohio courts. 59 Moreover, it ushered in a new attitude that has
been subsequently relied upon by Ohio courts.60
111. MODIFICATION AND FLEXMBILITY: LESSONS FROM THE VAN
SWERINGEN COVENANTS
As indicated above, courts in the era before Dixon typically ar-
ticulated a suspicion of real covenants. 61  These courts, however,
rarely if ever explained their hesitation. Thus, what emerges is an
empty mantra, unfortunately echoed by a number of modem courts,62
decrying restrictive schemes.
There are some concerns, however, with real covenants that may
underlie what often appear to be empty anti-restrictions declarations
of the courts. This section will explore these issues. Moreover, it
will show that the drafters of the Van Sweringen covenants and the
judicial opinions applying them took some important steps to address
the underlying concerns with real covenants and subdivision schemes.
A. Policy Considerations
1. Marketability
Perhaps the courts' negative attitude towards real covenants lies
in concerns over marketability of land. Some commentators have
58 Dixon, 166 N.E. at 889 (quoting Wallace v. Clifton Land Co., 110 N.E. 940, 942 (Ohio
1915)).
59 See supra notes 38-40.
60 See Ohio Turnpike Comm'n v. Goodnight Inn, Inc., 590 N.E.2d 1270, 1272 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1990) ("[I]f there is a substantial value in the restrictive covenant which is sought to be
protected, a court will enforce the covenant.") (citing Dixon, 166 N.E. at 887); Providence
Manor Homeowners Ass'n v. Conner, 694 N.E.2d 176, 177 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) ("Restrictive
covenants containing a general building scheme or plan for development are enforceable if the
covenants are not contrary to public policy.") (citing Dixon, 166 N.E. at 887); Glassburn v. Fair,
263 N.E.2d 570, 571 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970) ("Where an owner of land has adopted a general
building plan for the development of a particular tract which is designed to make it more attrac-
tive for residential purposes by reason of certain restrictive covenants, such covenants are bind-
ing and enforceable.") (citing Dixon, 166 N.E. at 887).
61 See supra notes 38-40.
62 See supra note 42.
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suggested that real covenants interfere with marketability.63 Market-
ability should not be a real problem, though-as long as a potential
purchaser has notice of the covenant that limits the value of the prop-
erty, she can reduce the purchase price accordingly. 64 If, for example,
a prospective purchaser were considering keeping chickens on a Van
Sweringen lot, he could still go ahead with the purchase but reduce
the price since the utility of the land will be less because of the Van
Sweringen restriction barring chickens and livestock.65 The lot is not
rendered unmarketable because of the restriction.
In theory, moreover, a buyer seeking to purchase a parcel free
and clear of an existing covenant can buy a release of the covenant
from the owner of the benefited parcel. Purchasing a release may be
difficult, however, in a subdivision context where one holdout can
prevent the release of a covenant consented to by all of the other
owners. As will be described below,66 the Van Sweringen documents
and the judicial decisions interpreting them were appropriately sensi-
tive to this holdout problem and its effect on marketability. These
covenants and cases serve as models for future developers and courts
on this issue.
2. Dead Hand Control
Another concern underlying the anti-restrictions policy may re-
flect concern over dead hand control. Covenants bind the land not
only as to the original purchaser but also as to all future owners, per-
haps in perpetuity. This potential inflexibility creates at least two
negative effects.
First, the presence of prior covenants may prevent the current
landowner from altering the uses of her property to meet current so-
cietal demands as expressed in the marketplace. This may hamper the
efficient use of land, always a concern since land is a limited re-
source.67 The presence of covenants may prevent a beneficial current
6 See French, Modem Law of Servitudes, supra note 6, at 1282-83 (discussing many of
the obstacles bona fide purchasers face in discovering encumbrances that might affect title);
Reichman, supra note 6, at 1189-90 (explaining that English courts disliked new servitudes as
potentially significant encumbrances on land).
64 Ohio courts have, appropriately, required notice to bind a purchaser to a subdivision
covenant. See, e.g., Emrick v. Multicon Builders, Inc., 566 N.E.2d 1189, 1192 (Ohio 1991)
(record or actual notice); Schurenberg v. Butler County Bd. of Elections, 605 N.E.2d 1330,
1333 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (same); Berry v. Paisley, 583 N.E.2d 430,433 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990)
(same); Abood v. Weingarten, 135 N.E.2d 899, 902 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956) (Van Sweringen
covenant; record and actual notice); Copelin v. Morris, 101 N.E.2d 18, 28 (Ohio C.P. Cuyahoga
County 1951) (same).
65 See infra note 94.
66 See infra Parts Il.C.1-2.
67 See In re Turners Crossroad Dev. Co., 277 N.W.2d 364, 368 (Minn. 1979) ("This
Court has serious reservations about the wisdom of allowing provisions contained in a 1949 real
estate transaction... to prevent the development of a substantial piece of real estate in 1978.")
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use of the property. As will be developed below, the Van Sweringen
covenants, with great foresight, included provisions to address this
issue.
Second, enforcing old covenants imposes the vision of the past
on current owners. This may offend current values and may frustrate
the aspirations and personal autonomy of the present owners. Unfor-
tunately, the Van Sweringen covenants contained such provisions that
had to be addressed in future years.
B. Duration of Van Sweringen Covenants
Potential marketability and dead hand control problems of cove-
nants are mitigated when the covenants are of limited duration. In the
absence of an express limitation on duration in the document, how-
ever, the courts have generally been unwilling to impose a limited
term and have held the covenant to be perpetual.68 It is noteworthy
that the various stages of the Van Sweringen development restrictions
expressly provided for a limited duration,69 a feature that many otherdevelopments lacked.
C. Modification and Release Provision
The Van Sweringens clearly contemplated a long life for their
covenant scheme. Promotional literature presented this as a selling
point, noting that the regulations "safeguard home communities [so]
that you can select your neighborhood now and safely plan for gen-
erations."7 At the same time, the developers included a provision
allowing for modification or cancellation of the restrictions, injecting
needed flexibility and alleviating marketability and dead hand control
issues. While there is some variation in this provision, a typical
clause states:
The Van Sweringen Company reserves the right to waive,
change or cancel any and all of the restrictions contained in
this instrument or in any other instrument given by the Van
Sweringen Company in respect to lots or parcels within the
Van Sweringen Company's subdivisions, or elsewhere if, in
its judgment, the development or lack of development war-
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 539 cmt. f
(1944) (a factor in deciding to enforce a covenant is that "land should be developed to its normal
capacity").
(' See KORNGOLD, supra note 6, § 11.01.
69 See Berger v. Van Sweringen Co., 216 N.E.2d 54, 57 (Ohio 1966) (noting that the
covenant runs until 2026, after which it can be terminated by consent of owners); Dixon v. Van
Sweringen Co., 166 N.E. 887, 888 (Ohio 1929) (noting expiration in 1999); Copelin v. Morris,
101 N.E.2d 18, 22-23 (Ohio C.P. Cuyahoga County 1951) (same).
70 HABERMAN, supra note 23, at 13 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
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rants the same or if, in its judgment, the ends or purposes of
said subdivisions would be better served! 1
This provision is noteworthy in several respects. First, in the ab-
sence of such a clause, a subdivision covenant can only be modified
or amended upon the unanimous consent of all owners.7 2 Such a
situation exposes the subdivision owners to the problem of a single
holdout whose intransigence can prevent an alteration of the covenant
scheme that would perhaps increase the utility of the land to the other
owners or make the land in the subdivision more responsive to current
communal demands. Market mechanisms alone may be insufficient
in these cases-sometimes a holdout is simply eccentric and will ref-
use generous buyout terms offered by the other owners. The law
protects the holdout's right to resist,73 but that does not mean that the
end result is good in terms of marketability and dead hand control
concerns.
1. Who Can Modify or Release?
a. The Developer
Although the Van Sweringens injected desirable flexibility into
the covenant schbme with the modification and waiver provision, the
choice of the Van Sweringen Company as the entity with the power to
make such decisions raises some concerns. Empowering the Van
Sweringen Company in such matters gave the company an opportu-
nity to maximize its market position. It could sell restricted lots and
receive a premium from buyers seeking to live in a controlled resi-
dential community. At the same time, if the development concept
failed to attract customers-and remember, this was the early period
of large scale subdivision developments and one could not foretell the
success that was to come-the developers could release the covenants
as to the remaining lots and sell them to non-residential users.74
However, the homeowners could have interests that strongly di-
verge from the developer and they could be the losers with amend-
ment and modification power being retained by the developer. For
example, the Company could theoretically market the bulk of the
71 Berger, 216 N.E.2d at 58 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted); see also Dixon, 166
N.E. at 888; Risman v. Van Sweringen Co., 179 N.E.2d 117, 120-21 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962);
Abood v. Weingarten, 135 N.E.2d 899, 901-02 (Ohio CL App. 1956).
72 See, e.g., White v. Lewis, 487 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Ark. 1972); Hanchett v. East Sun-
nyside Civic League, 696 S.W.2d 613, 615 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); Hening v. Maynard, 313
S.E.2d 379, 382 (Va. 1984).
73 See Rick v. West, 228 N.Y.S.2d 195,200 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
74 Responding to similar concerns, modem developers often subdivide, restrict, and mar-
ket their projects in stages to avoid being left with a large, undersold subdivision that has all lots
locked in to residential uses. See KORNGOLD, supra note 6, § 9.09.
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residential lots, then release the covenants on the remaining land and
sell to commercial users. Commercial entities would pay a premium
price to the Company to be one of the few businesses surrounded by
many residential customers (a quasi-monopoly position). Thus the
Company may have an incentive to release or modify the covenants
even though the homeowners would object to introduction of com-
mercial uses in their residential community.75 During the early stages
of marketing the subdivision, the Company might be unlikely to so
frustrate owner expectations since that would hurt its attempts to sell
lots to other customers; but in the latter stages of the development,
that market constraint would be reduced.
b. The Homeowners
While retention of consent power by the developer will best
serve the developer's needs, the better alternative to address the long-
term marketability and dead hand control problems of real covenants
is to provide for modification and amendment power by less-than-
unanimous consent of the homeowners themselves. This is often
done in modem subdivision developments, with modification allowed
perhaps by a majority, two-thirds, or three-quarters of the owners.76
This permits the interested homeowners, through the exercise of a
democratic process, to determine the future use of the land and re-
solve these fundamentally local land use issues. The power of hold-
outs can be minimized, flexibility can be achieved to meet new con-
ditions, and needlessly burdensome ties on land can be modified.
Moreover, these subdivisions often create an association of the
homeowners with a democratically elected governing board that is
empowered to administer and enforce the covenants. These bodies
may exercise discretionary powers under the covenants, such as
regulation of aesthetic and architecture features of the homes. 78 This
increases flexibility since original documents cannot foresee all issues
that will arise. Such delegation also benefits the subdivision by pro-
viding for ongoing supervision and enforcement of the covenant
scheme as determined by the democratic process.
To be sure, there is a potential for abuse in modem subdivision
schemes with less-than-unanimous modification provisions and pri-
75 See, e.g., Shaker Coventry Corp. v. Shaker Heights Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 180 N.E.2d
27 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962) (referring to 1947 waiver by Van Sweringen Company of restriction
barring apartment house).
76 KORNGOLD, supra note 6, § 11.03.
77 See Komgold, supra note 9, at 513; see also Gosnay v. Big Sky Owners Ass'n, 666
P.2d 1247 (Mont. 1983) (describing a homeowners' association); Uriel Reichman, Residential
Private Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 253 (1976) (describing how
homeowners' associations resemble local government).
78 See, e.g., Landen Farm Community Servs. Ass'n v. Schube, 604 N.E.2d 235 (Ohio CL
App. 1992) (allowing an association to enforce basketball hoop regulations).
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vate residential governments. The deciding group of homeowners
could chose to place the burden of a modification on one particular
homeowner. Thus, while all of the other homeowners would benefit
from a convenience store in the subdivision, the lot owner adjoining
the store would be harmed by the noise and traffic, which would
translate into a loss of property value. Some courts have appropri-
ately recognized the potential danger of the tyranny of majority in
less-than-unanimous consent provisions and have required that
changes pursuant to such clauses must apply uniformly to all proper-
ties."
c. Successor to the Developer
As originally drafted and conceived, the reservation of power to
modify and amend in the Van Sweringen Company did not support
democratic self-determination by the owners themselves but rather
could be asserted to serve the more narrow interests of the Company.
However, the power to waive or modify the covenants passed from
the private Van Sweringen Company and can currently be exercised
upon a majority vote of the mayors of Shaker Heights, Beachwood,
and Pepper Pike (the three cities in which the original Van Sweringen
subdivisions are located).80
Placing the power to agree to modifications and waivers in the
hands of three elected public officials may provide some useful les-
sons for homeowners and private governments granted similar pow-
ers. There is a risk of unfairness in the process of private govern-
ments, where decision-makers are often inexperienced and not subject
to express rules or norms. Thus, courts have had to impose require-
ments of notice and the opportunity to be heard as well as ensure that
governing boards follow existing written procedures and prevent bias
in decision-making.
8 1
79 See, e.g., Jaskiewicz v. Walton, 549 A.2d 774 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (voiding
amendment releasing only one lot); Ridge Park Home Owners v. Pena, 544 P.2d 278 (N.M.
1975) (same).
r There is some ambiguity as to the precise manner in which this mayoral power is to be
exercised. One version describes the 1959 organization of the Van Sweringen Foundation, a
not-for-profit corporation, to hold substantially all the stock of the Van Sweringen Company.
The Foundation's purpose was to operate for the benefit of the three cities. The mayors of the
three cities elect the directors of the Company, and the directors pass on modification determi-
nations. The mayors thus control decisions as to modification. See Berger v. Van Sweringen
Co., 216 N.E.2d 54 (Ohio 1966); Rothchild v. Central Motors Corp., No. 63743, 1993 WL
398553 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 7, 1993); see also Risman v. Van Sweringen Co., 179 N.E.2d 117
(Ohio Ct. App. 1962). However, it appears that in some cases the three mayors directly execute
waiver documents, without use of the Foundation entity. See, e.g., Cancellation of Restrictions,
recorded in Cuyahoga County, vol. 93-08859, at 30 (July 22, 1993) (signators for the Van
Sweringen Company are the three mayors, who are designated "successor directors" of the
Company).
81 See Komgold, supra note 9, at 528-529.
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In contrast, publicly elected officials are more likely to be expe-
rienced in decision-making. Their actions and procedures are circum-
scribed by an extensive constitutional, statutory, and common-law
framework. And the citizenry can vote elected officials out of office
when the community loses confidence in their decisions.
2. Limitations on Exercise of Modification Power
Cases involving the Van Sweringen covenants teach an impor-
tant lesson-even when an entity has legitimate power to modify or
release covenants, it cannot exercise that power in a way that destroys
the fundamental underpinnings of the subdivision arrangement. In
Berger v. Van Sweringen Co.,82 the directors appointed by the three
mayors voted to waive the residential restrictions on an eighty-acre
tract of the Van Sweringen land to permit the owners to construct a
shopping center. The court held that the release power was not un-
limited but
was to provide a means whereby one who bought property in
good faith could escape the burden of the restrictions if it was
found to be impossible to continue the development as
planned, and still provide protection for the property of sur-
rounding owners who had bought on the strength of the re-
strictions.
83
The court's decision can be justified on several grounds. First,
the intent of the parties is essential in deciding whether a covenant
scheme is created and in deciding the meaning and extent of cove-
nants.84 The Berger court apparently felt that the intent of the parties
did not include such a fundamental change in the nature of the com-
munity and that the proposed change would destroy the goal of a uni-85 86
form residential area. Other courts have reached similar results.
Second, the release proposed in Berger would have unduly bur-
dened some owners (the neighboring residential lots) to the benefit of
the defendant-developers (who would have the benefit of valuable
commercial land) and non-neighboring residential lots (who would
have commercial services nearby, but not in their backyards). As de-
82 216 N.E.2d 54, 56 (Ohio 1966).
8' Id. at 59.
84 See KORNGOLD, supra note 6, § 10.04.
85 See Berger, 216 N.E. 2d at 59-60. Cf Montoya v. Barreras, 473 P.2d 363, 365 (N.M.
1970) (considering both the intent and object of the parties in making the restriction).
86 See, e.g., Riley v. Boyle, 434 P. 2d 525 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967) (holding that restrictions
must be applied to all lots in order to maintain uniformity); Bay Island Towers, Inc. v. Bay
Island-Siesta Ass'n, 316 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that a high-rise apart-
ment building would be out of place in a neighborhood of garden apartments). Cf Levitt
Homes, Inc. v. Old Farm Homeowner's Ass'n, 444 N.E.2d 194 (11. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that
an amendment allowing smaller houses was consistent with the general scheme).
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scribed above, courts have justifiably rejected such results.8 7 In
Dixon, the court upheld the delegation of powers to consent to modi-
fications to the Company but warned that "judgment would have to be
exercised reasonably ... and not in an arbitrary, captious manner,
calculated to be obviously injurious to the rights of the lot owners."
88
One might also understand the key provisions of the original sub-
division instruments as comprising a constitutional document, setting
out fundamental expectations of the owners that may not be violated.
In this way, individual rights are protected against the intrusions of
the majority.
IV. LIMITs ON SUBJECT MATTER OF COVENANTS
The Van Sweringen covenants raise another key issue: are there
limits to the substantive provisions that may be imposed by private
land use controls? Freedom of contract would argue for the enforce-
ment of any consensual arrangement, with market forces serving to
eliminate inefficient and foolish covenants. Anti-restriction concerns,
however, would support judicial invalidation of freely negotiated
covenants that create problems of dead hand control.
In other works, I have argued that while covenants should be en-
forced as a general matter under the principle of freedom of contract,
certain covenants offending the personal autonomy of the current
owner should be barred.89 Thus, courts should enforce restrictions
that regulate an owner's external behavior (as measured by objective
criteria) rather than her status or private conduct.90 Restrictions con-
trolling harmful spillovers on other subdivision owners (e.g., exces-
sive noise or traffic) should be enforced, while controls on personal
choices and behavior within the home (e.g., servitudes limiting occu-
pancy to a "traditional" family) should not.91 This model would
achieve the benefits of subdivision arrangements by preventing be-
havior destructive to the community, while protecting personal auton-
omy from the threat of intrusive, perpetual servitudes.
How do the Van Sweringen covenants measure up against these
standards? As developed below, while most would be sustainable
under my proposed rule, a few troubling provisions would require
judicial or legislative responses.
87 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
88 Dixon v. Van Sweingen Co., 166 N.E. 887, 891 (Ohio 1929).
89 See KORNGOLD, supra note 6, § 8.02; Gerald Komgold, For Unifying Servitudes and
Defeasible Fees: Property Law's Functional Equivalents, 66 Tx. L. Rav. 533 (1988); Gerald
Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the Context of in Gross
Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TaX. L. REV. 433 (1984); see also infra notes 90-91 for
additional articles.
90 See Komgold, supra note 9, at 526.
91 See Gerald Korngold, Single Family Use Covenants: For Achieving a Balance Between
Traditional Family Life and Individual Autonomy, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 951,967 (1989).
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A. Building and Use Restrictions
A large number of the Van Sweringen covenants involve build-
ing and use restrictions. Thus, the covenants in the various stages of
the Van Sweringen development provide residential-only limitations
on the use of the property, setback restrictions, landscaping require-
ments, and limitations on additional structures.9 2 Some later sections
of the development also specified the location of driveways, required
smoke-free fuel in heating systems, 93 and barred chickens and live-
stock of any kind.94
These types of covenants should be upheld under my suggested
approach since they protect neighboring owners from intrusions (e.g.,
by preventing noise and disruption from commercial activity), en-
hance value and enjoyment of the owners by controlling the physical
environment (e.g., by landscaping, structure, and livestock controls),
and improve safety (e.g., by providing sight lines for traffic with set-
back requirements and benefit health with limitations on smoke).
Courts typically enforce such restrictions. 9
B. Architectural Controls
Architectural and aesthetic covenants and regulations were cen-
tral to the conceptualization, marketing, and operation of Shaker
Heights. The Van Sweringens sought to create a high-quality, har-
monious development exemplifying high aesthetic values. 9  The
Shaker Village Standards, distributed to lot purchasers, declared the
virtues of good design and neighborhood consistency:
Everyone delights in the graceful lines of a beautiful
residence.
The well-planned house and garden universally appeal.
Good taste calls for well-designed residences that com-
bine the things that make for comfort and convenience with
the things that make for beauty.
The beautiful home is proportioned to both fit site and
surroundings.
97
92 See Copelin v. Morris, 101 N.E.2d 18, 21-22 (Ohio C.P. Cuyahoga County 1951) (ad-
judicating a 1920 deed provision); Instrument Imposing Restrictions Upon and Reserving Cer-
tain Rights on Property Located in Pepper Pike, Cuyahoga County, Ohio, recorded in Cuyahoga
County, No. 072148 (Oct. 4, 1956) [hereinafter Pepper Pike Restrictions].
9' See Copelin, 101 N.E.2d at 31-32; Pepper Pike Restrictions, supra note 92, at 4.
94 See Pepper Pike Restrictions, supra note 92, at 3.
95 See KORNGOLD, supra note 6, § 10.05.
96 See CITY OF SHAKER HEIGHTS LANDMARK COMM'N, supra note 23, at 14; STILGOE,
supra note 24, at 241(describing early sales literature).
97 SHAKER VILLAGE STANDARDS, supra note 47, at 3.
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Some early phases of the development sought to achieve this
aesthetic control by simply imposing a requirement that no house
could be erected without prior approval of the Van Sweringen Com-
pany.98 The Shaker Village Standards sets out detailed specific
guidelines imposed by the Company in the approval process, covering
various aspects of construction: the architect and his qualifications;
the types of drawings to be submitted; site layout and setbacks;
driveway, roof, and porch rules; size, height, depth, and entranceways
to the house; specific materials, exterior trim, permitted paint schemes
and color combinations; and other details.99 These standards had to
strike a careful balance. On one hand, they exerted tremendous con-
trol (for example, only colonial, English or French style homes were
permitted),100 with great attention to detail (for example, "In all
leaded glass work, genuine lead bars should be used instead of zinc.
The effect of zinc is flashy and therefore not in good taste." 01). But
while such harmony was essential, uniformity was to be avoided:
"Each house should be distinct in design and detail from every other
house."
102
There are conflicting values at stake on the question of whether
architectural and aesthetic regulation should be enforced. On one
hand, these regulations promote subdivision arrangements and the
free choice of owners to buy into such a community. They enhance
property values by preventing "eyesores" and create ambience and
satisfaction for the owners. The concept of freedom of contract sup-
ports the enforcement of aesthetic regulations.
On the other hand, aesthetic controls restrict the nonconforming
owner's freedom of expression and aspirations for her property.
While not a governmental action subject to constitutional limitations,
some of the values of First Amendment freedom of expression-cen-
tral to our society-may arguably be offended. Moreover, limiting
architectural expression for generations into the future raises concerns
about the power of the dead hand.
On balance, aesthetic regulations should be, and are, enforced. 103
They serve the fundamental goal of subdivision development, and
owners voluntarily purchase with knowledge of these controls. Ohio
courts have cited the validation of the Van Sweringen subdivision
9" See Copelin, 101 N.E.2d at 21.
99 See SHAKER VILLAGE STANDARDS, supra note 47. Some later portions of the Van
Sweringen development imposed covenants requiring approval before building and also in-
cluding specifics as to color, roofing, and design, but with far less detail than the SHAKER
VILLAGE STANDARDS. See Pepper Pike Restrictions, supra note 92, at 2.
100 See CITY OF SHAKER HEIGHTS LANDMARK COMM'N, supra note 23, at 3.
10J SHAKER VILLAGE STANDARDS, supra note 47, at 17.
'02 Id. at 9.
103 See KORNGOLD, supra note 6, § 10.07.
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covenants in Dixon in upholding aesthetic controls.1°4 The Ohio
courts, however, have sometimes refused to enforce provisions that
do not include criteria to guide the approving body.1  In contrast,
courts in other jurisdictions recognize the difficulty in articulating
architectural standards. They typically uphold such covenants as long
as the standard is applied fairly and reasonably and the particular de-
cision is consistent with other structures and the development plan. 1
6
C. Racial and Religious Restrictions: Covenants that Violate Public
Policy
The Van Sweringen covenants stated that the property could not
be "occupied, leased, rented, conveyed, or otherwise alienated" with-
out the written consent of the Van Sweringen Company or the major-
ity of owners of lots within a defined area. 10 7 These provisions raise
fundamental questions.
First, the language creates a direct restraint on alienation that
would likely be voided by the courts as unreasonable. 10 8 Restraints
on alienation are not desirable as they impede the operation of a free
market in land, restrain the development and improvement of prop-
erty, and restrict the freedom of movement of would-be sellers and
buyers. 109
Moreover, this covenant could be used to exclude racial and re-
ligious minorities from purchasing within the subdivision. From the
turn of the century some large-scale subdividers included deed re-
strictions barring non-whites, particularly African-Americans and
Asians, and religious minorities, particularly Jews.'10 A 1928 study
104 See e.g., Fairfax Community Ass'n v. Boughton, 127 N.E.2d 641, 644 (Ohio C.P.
Cuyahoga County 1955) (upholding a restriction that homes must meet minimum square foot-
age requirements).
105 See, e.g., Prestwick Landowners' Ass'n v. Underhill, 429 N.E.2d 1191 (Ohio CL App.
1980) (declining to enforce restriction because restriction contained no written or de facto
guidelines); D & N Dev., Inc. v. Schrock, No. 89AP080066, 1990 WL 41691 (Ohio CL App.
Mar. 21, 1990) (voiding architectural approval clause without standards as against public pol-
icy).
106 See KORNGOLD, supra note 6, § 10.07.
10'7 Copelin v. Morris, 101 N.E.2d 18, 31 (Ohio C.P. Cuyahoga County 1951) (quoting the
language of the restriction); Pepper Pike Restrictions, supra note 92, at 3. The defined area
includes lots that adjoin or abut the lot in question, on both sides of the street, and that are five
lots from the sidelines of the property in question. See Copelin, 101 N.E.2d at 31.
108 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 3.4 cmt. d (2000) (discussing
restraints on transfer without consent); see also Tuckerton Beach Club v. Bender, 219 A.2d 529
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966) (voiding covenants requiring property owners to join property
owners' associations and pay dues); Mountain Springs Ass'n v. Wilson, 196 A.2d 270 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1963) (finding a restraint on alienation of property unreasonable).
109 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 3.4 cmt. c (discussing crite-
ria for determining reasonableness of restraint).
110 See MCKENZIE, supra note 12, at 58 (discussing policies of exclusion by homeowner
associations); WEISS, supra note 13, at 45. See also CLIFFORD EDWARD CLARK, JR., THE
AMERICAN FAMILY HOME, 1800-1960, at 231 (1984) (explaining the middle class image was
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of eighty-four high-end residential subdivisions indicated that nearly
one-half had racially restrictive covenants."' The practice of racially
restrictive covenants was a twentieth-century response by developers
to African-American relocation from the South to the North and
Asian migration to the West.1 2 These covenants were also encour-
aged by the Federal Housing Administration under a theory that ra-
cially restrictive covenants increased property values.!1 3 It Was only
in 1948 that such restrictive covenants were held unenforceable in
Shelley v. Kraemer.
114
Although the Van Sweringen developments did not contain an
express racial or religious covenant, clauses requiring the developer's
approval before transfer "implicitly meant racial exclusion."" 5  The
approval covenants were unfortunately used in Shaker Heights to ex-
clude African-Americans and religious minorities.
1 6
It took the Supreme Court and an expansive view of state action
in Shelley to end racial and religious covenants. 1 7 It was regrettable
that the law of servitudes has not evolved to the point of invalidating
these covenants without resort to constitutional theory. Under the
approach that I suggested earlier," 8 racial and religious servitudes
would be unenforceable as they control the status of individuals and
private conduct within the home. Racial and religious covenants are
important reminders of the need to closely circumscribe covenants
offending personal autonomy.
The need to address covenants offending personal autonomy as
an internal matter of covenant law is especially important given its
history. It appears that racial covenants spread in the American North
and West as a direct response to the invalidation of governmental ra-
reinforced with restrictive covenants); MARSH, supra note 33, at 169-71 (discussing racial
covenants in Los Angeles).
111 See MCKENZIE, supra note 12, at 44.
112 See id. at 44.
"3 See id. at 58, 64. See also DOLORES HAYDEN, REDESIGNING THE AMERICAN DREAM 7
(1984).114 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
11 MCKENZIE, supra note 12, at44 (citing the conclusion of a 1928 study).
116 See HABERMAN, supra note 23, at 13-14; see also STILGOE, supra note 24, at 241.
A committee was formed in Shaker Heights to "prevent occupancy ... of persons who
might be deemed by the residents of that neighborhood as undesirable neighbors." REPORT OF
THE COMMH-rEE OF THE SHAKER HEIGHTS PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION 1 (1925). Apparently
sensitive to claims of religious and racial exclusion, the Report opaquely stated: "When selec-
tions are made without prejudice, religious or otherwise, no just criticism can be made or at any
rate should not be made by any one who has sufficient pride not to insist upon living in a re-
stricted residential community in which he is not desired." Id. at 2.
17 In 1965, Ohio passed a statute making it unlawful discrimination to include a restrictive
covenant in a deed that limits transfer based on race and religion. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 4112.01(A)(1 1), 4112.02(H)(9) (Vest 1994) (declaring it unlawful discrimination to include
in a deed a restrictive covenant that limits transfer based on race or religion).
118 See supra text accompanying notes 89-91.
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cial zoning by the Supreme Court in 1917.9 One would have hoped
that the law of covenants would have been up to the task of prevent-
ing the privatizing of prejudice.1
20
I have asserted in earlier works that courts could limit covenants
offending personal autonomy by applying the doctrine that bars en-
forcement of covenants violating public policy. 121  The Restatement
(Third) of Property: Servitudes, promulgated in 2000, states that ser-
vitudes violating public policy are invalid. 122 The comment specifi-
cally indicates that attempts by servitude communities to regulate the
exercise of fundamental rights are generally not valid unless the exer-
cise brings an adverse affect on the community.123 In voiding cove-
nants intruding on personal autonomy, the Ohio courts could rely on
the language of Dixon, which declared that a covenant violates public
policy if it is "injurious to the public or against the public good." 
2 4
V. THE VAN SWERINGEN COVENANTS MEET EUCLID: COVENANTS
AND ZONING COMPARED
The triumph of governmental zoning in Euclid marked the be-
ginning of the decline of the importance of the Van Sweringen cove-
nants as land use controls in the communities in which the properties
were located. In 1925, the Village Council of Beachwood adopted a
zoning ordinance implementing many of the same type of building
and use restrictions provided in the Van Sweringen covenants and
designating zones for particular construction. 125 Shaker Heights fol-
lowed in 1926,126 and Pepper Pike also adopted a similar ordinance.
127
A. From Covenants to Zoning
This chain of events might be understood as part of a larger phe-
nomenon in the United States. It has been asserted that the willing,
and even eager, acceptance by purchasers of private deed restrictions
119 See MCKENZIE, supra note 12, at 68 (citing to Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
(1917)) (holding unconstitutional a city ordinance that prevented blacks from occupying homes
on blocks where the greater number of houses are occupied by whites).
120 See Re Drummond Wren, [1945] O.R. 778 (Ontario High Court 1945) (voiding cove-
nant barring sale of land to "Jews or persons of objectionable nationality" as a covenant violat-
ing public policy), quoted in Sipes v. McGhee, 25 N.W.2d 638, 662 (Mich. 1947).
121 See Korngold, supra note 91, at 951-952; Korugold, supra note 9, at 527; see generally
KORNGOLD, supra note 6, § 10.02 (discussing covenants violating public policy).
122 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (2000).
'2- See id. cmt. h.
"2 Dixon v. Van Sweringen Co., 166 N.E. 887, 889 (Ohio 1929).
12 See Willott v. Village of Beachwood, 188 N.E.2d 625, 627 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963)
(voiding amended ordinance that rezoned land in Beachwood, Ohio).
'26 See id. at 626 (discussing the Shaker Heights zoning ordinance); see also Shaker Cov-
entry Corp. v. Shaker Heights Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 180 N.E.2d 27 (Ohio Ct. App. 1967)
(holding a zoning ordinance unconstitutional under Ohio law).
127 See Central Motors Corp. v. City of Pepper Pike, 409 N.E.2d 258 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979).
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in American subdivisions paved the way to the wide adoption of pub-
lic land use controls across the country. 128 Covenant schemes "le-
gitimized the idea that private owners should surrender some of their
individual property rights for the common good, including their
own." 129 Moreover, deed restrictions served as the "physical and po-
litical model" for zoning ordinances.13° Subdividers and their plan-
ners tested and refined land use planning through their work on deed
restrictions, developing building and use restrictions, architectural
standards, and zones for different uses.13' Large-scale community
subdividers supported public land use controls, in contrast to smaller
subdividers, and shaped and controlled it.'
32
Public zoning regulations and private covenants are separate and
independent restrictions on land and do not supersede each other.
133
As time passed, only zoning has survived in some areas originally
covered by the Van Sweringen covenants, since some terms for the
covenants have expired. 134  Moreover, zoning ordinances in these
communities have developed to a more comprehensive and detailed
system of land use regulation than the Van Sweringen covenants pro-
vided. This appears consistent with the pattern in other parts of the
country, where large-scale subdividers sought public zoning to sup-
plement private covenants and regulate matters not covered by the
deeds.1 35 These other subdividers believed that the public land plan-
ning process would sufficiently represent their interests. 36 There is at
least some indication that the Village of Shaker Heights and the Van
Sweringen Company acted in concert in land use decisions.
1 37
B. Comparison of Zoning and Covenants
Zoning has certain advantages over private land use devices.
First, zoning can provide a comprehensive solution for all of the land
held by different owners within the governmental unit. Covenants, in
contrast, can only be imposed by a subdivider on land that he owns;
138
thus only a smaller area can be subjected to regulation.
128 See WEISS, supra note 13, at 69.
29 Id. at 69.
'30 See id. at 4.
"' See ida t 69-70.
132 See MCKENZIE, supra note 12, at 38-39.
133 See KORNGOLD, supra note 6, § 10.03; see also Central Motors Corp. v. City of Pepper
Pike, 409 N.E.2d 258, 280 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979) ("Mhe presence of deed restrictions has no
effect on zoning ....").
13 See supra text accompanying note 69.
135 See WEISS, supra note 13, at 11.
136 See id. at 11.
137 See Malacek v. Shaker Heights, 8 Ohio Law Abs. 555 (Ohio Ct. App. 1930) (rejecting
plaintiff's allegation as without proof that the Van Sweringen Company exercised undue influ-
ence over Shaker Heights).
138 See KORNGOLD, supra note 6, § 9.03.
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Moreover, zoning provides greater adaptability going forward.
Governmental bodies can amend plans, providing flexibility. 139 Ad-
ditionally, decisions by public officials and bodies are subject to pro-
cedural protections, providing due process and preventing bias against
individuals. 140 Zoning provides further safeguards since the substance
of zoning regulations is controlled by constitutional doctrines and
legislative systems. Thus, there are appropriate limits on the degree
to which zoning can intrude into the privacy of homes and the per-
sonal autonomy of the owners. 14  As described above,142 the law of
covenants unfortunately did not easily provide protections against
similar intrusions against personal autonomy created by private land
use arrangements.
But the eclipsing of the private covenant schemes comes with
not insignificant costs. Covenants provide greater stability than zon-
ing because they are more difficult to amend and modify. Changes in
servitudes can be made only by the affected property owners them-
selves. Zoning, on the other hand, can be modified by the governing
political body and does not require the consent of the affected own-
ers. 143 Citizens and interested parties from outside the affected area
may exert undue power over the zoning process.1
44
Additionally, private governments are likely to be more efficient
in governing than public bodies. They can modify covenants more
quickly and cheaply than public government can amend zoning, re-
sultins in lowered transaction costs and efficiencies for the commu-
nity.' Moreover, governing boards of homeowners associations can
develop an extensive regulatory scheme and system of rules, provid-
ing for a more controlled-and desirable from the owners' perspec-
tive-living environment.
1 46
This suggests that a combination of public zoning and private
covenants may provide the best result. Large scale planning can be
accomplished, but, at the same time, control over local decisions
139 See supra text accompanying notes 80-8 1.
1- See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
141 See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (striking down housing
code limiting the number of related persons permitted to share residence); Harmon v. Tyler, 273
U.S. 668 (1927) (invalidating ordinance barring African Americans from establishing homes in
white communities); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (striking down as unconstitu-
tional an ordinance preventing persons of color from living in certain areas).
142 See supra Part II.
143 See Robert H. Consigny & Zigurds L. Zile, Use of Restrictive Covenants in a Rapidly
Urbanizing Area, 1958 Wis. L. REv. 612, 614 ("There is never any certitude that a particular
scheme of [public] controls will remain unmodified over a period of time.").
'4 See A.J. CASNER, W.B. LEACH, SusAN FRENCH, GERALD KORNGOLD & LEA VANDER
VELDE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY 954-955 (4th ed. 2000); see also Ellickson,
supra note 6, at 691-693.
145 See Korngold, supra note 9, at 513-16.
146 See CASNER ET AL., supra note 144, at 955.
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would be exerted by the parties most interested in and affected by the
regulations.
CONCLUSION
The dawn of the era of public land use regulation in the United
States-launched by the Supreme Court in Euclid-took place at the
same time that developers were beginning to extensively use private
land use controls to create large-scale subdivision and community
projects. Over the course of the twentieth century, the use of both the
public and private land use systems has grown tremendously. Zoning
and related legislation have not dampened the market demand for pri-
vate servitude regimes, and private land use regulation will continue
to significantly affect how communities are created and how Ameri-
cans live. The experience of the early subdivision schemes, such as
the Van Sweringen development located a few miles away from the
Village of Euclid, teaches much about the benefits and limits of cur-
rent day and future private land use arrangements.

